SUBJECT: Combat After Action Interview Report.

THRU:    Commanding General
         United States Army Vietnam
         ATTN: Command Historian
         APO San Francisco 96375

1.  TYPE OF OPERATION:  Airmobile Raid.

2.  DATE OF OPERATION:  19 July 1969

3.  LOCATION:  Grid:  XT589269; Sheet Number NC48-1, Map Series 1501;  25th Infantry Division TAOR.

4.  CONTROL HEADQUARTERS:  2nd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division.

5.  PERSONS BEING INTERVIEWED:

    a. MAJ Ronald L. Baker Jr., 503403348, S3, 1st Battalion (Mechanized), 5th Infantry.

    b. CPT Bruce R. Richardsen, 516529365, Arty LNO to 1st Battalion (Mechanized), 5th Infantry.

    c. CPT John S. Regan, 001304764, CO, Company B, 2nd Battalion, 14th Infantry.

    d. CW2 James H. Hineline, 027264459, Chief, Imagery Interpretation Section, 25th Military Intelligence Detachment.

6.  INTERVIEWING OFFICER:  Division Historian

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    b. Company B, 2nd Battalion, 14th Infantry (OPCON to 1-5 Mech).

8.  SUPPORTING FORCES:

    a. Artillery.

        (1) Battery C, 1st Battalion, 8th Artillery (105mm), FSB Devin (XT557170)

        (2) Battery B, 1st Battalion, 8th Artillery (105mm), FSB Pershing (XT518256)

        (3) Battery A, 3rd Battalion, 13th Artillery (155mm), FSB Patton II (XT582195)

        (4) One Platoon, Battery D, 3rd Battalion, 13th Artillery (8 inch), FSB Stuart III (XT499197)

    b.  Army Aviation.

        (1) 9 UH1H helicopters (Troop Lift), 187th Assault Helicopter Company.

        (2) 1 UH1H helicopter (C&C Ship), 187th Assau8lt Helicopter Company

        (3) 6 AH1G Cobra gunships, Company B, 25th Aviation Battalion.

        (4) 2 AH1G Cobra gunships, Troop D, 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry.

        (5) 2 AH1G Cobra gunships, Troop C, 3rd Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry

        (6) 1 UH1H helicopter (PSYOPS), Company B, 25th Aviation Battalion.

    c.  U.S. Air Force.

        (1) 1 AC-47 gunship.

        (2) 2 F-100 fighters.

        (3) 2 A-37 fighters.

        (4) 1 OV-10 forward air control aircraft.


[Start of next page missing...] of the 25th Division Military Intelligence Detachment was performing a routine read-out of low level aerial photographs taken over Tu Duon Hamlet (XT589269) when they noticed that the last two frames indicated a newly constructed hut which was larger than the other huts in the area, and was distinguishable by its wooden roof, in contrast to the thatched roofs of the other huts in the vicinity.  It was also noted that two heavily used trails by-passed this structure and converged at a pint approximately 50 meters to the southwest; however, there were no trails leading directly to this structure.  Four excavations were also noted:  (1) a trench approximately 20 feet long, four feet wide, and four feet deep along the southwest side of the house;  (2) holes, one at the west corner and one at the south corner of the hut; and (3) a hole at the north corner of the structure.

    On 13 June, a hand-held photograph of the same structure was taken by the Aerial Surveillance Section, G-2 Air, and the results indicated that (1) a trench leading from the door of the hut to the trail which passed to the southeast had been excavated, as well as (2) three mounds which resembled graves appeared at the northeast side of the house.

    On 1 July, an Air Force photo reconnaissance mission revealed the addition of approximately twelve excavations which resembled graves on the northeast side of the hut under surveillance.  Also a possible "well" was observed on the northern edge of these excavations, as well as three new mounds just north of the hut.

    On 10 July, a prisoner, Truong Van Thang, was captured by Company B, 2-14 Inf, in the vicinity of Sa Nho (XT575275).  After several interrogations, Thang admitted that he was a member of the 1st Company, 83rd Rear Service Group, and stated that his unit had the responsibility of supplying feed for NVA units operating in the Tu Duon/Sa Nho area.  Thang additionally revealed that he knew the location of a house where 20-25 members of his unit stayed each night.  These personnel arrived each night at approximately 1800 hours and remained until dawn the following morning.  He indicated that this house had been used every night for the past seven months.  On 16 July, a Visual Reconnaissance mission was flown by the IPW Section and hand-held photographs were taken of the Sa Nho area.  The photographs were shown to Thang, who immediately identified the same hut which had been under surveillance by the Imagery Interpretation Section.

    On 12 July, the Aerial Surveillance Section, G-2 Air, had taken a second set of hand-held photographs of the hut.  These photographs revealed that (1) the trench previously noted as being 20 feet long had been filled in; (2) the hole on the south corner of the house had also been filled in; (3) the hole on the north corner of the house was covered with an unidentified material; and (4) the area of the suspected graves now resembled [end of page]

    [Start of next page missing...] The above information was passed by the counter-intelligence section to the S2 of the 2nd Brigade who in turn recommended the target to the Brigade S3 for response.  The Brigade decision was to conduct an early evening airmobile raid and the mission was given to the 1st Battalion (Mechanized), 5th Infantry.

    After a careful reconnaissance and evaluation of the objective, the Battalion Commander decided to employ heavy preparatory gunship and artillery fires, a close troop insertion, continuous close fire support, and a rapid troop extraction.  Two platoons from Company B, 2-14 Inf, would be employed.

    b.  Terrain - The terrain in the target area is flat with no dominating features.  There is heavy brush northeast, east and southeast of the hut, while the area to the west is open, being abandoned rice fields.  There are several abandoned huts approximately 150 meters south of the target hut and a single abandoned hut approximately 80 meters to the north.  Ground observation and fields of fire are excellent on the west side of the target and poor on the east side due to the brush.  Aerial observation over the brushy area is fair since the continuity of the vegetation is broken by many small trails and shell craters.  There are no obstacles to movement by foot in the area.

    c.  Weather - The skies were partly cloudy with light winds from the southwest and no precipitation in the area on 19 July.  Observation and flying conditions were good.  Sunset was at 1922 hours.

10.  MISSION:  Company B, 2nd Battalion, 14th Infantry (OPCON 1-5 Mech) was to conduct an airmobile raid at 1800 hours, 19 July 1969, to capture or destroy personnel and equipment of the 83rd Rear Service Group in and around the target structure.

11.  CONCEPT OF OPERATION:

    a.  Maneuver - Company B was to conduct a nine ship (54 man) combat assault to an LZ approximately 100 meters west of the target area (XT587279), assault the target structure and the adjacent area, complete a search of the target area and return to the pick-up zone (XT587270) for extraction.

    b.  Fires -

        (1) Helicopter gunship preparatory fires on the target hut - H-6 minutes.

        (2) Artillery preparatory fires on the target hut - H-4 minutes.  Preparatory fires shifted east H-4 minutes to H-1 minute.  [end of page]

    [Start of next page missing...]
12.  EXECUTION:

    a.  At 1730 hours, the command and control helicopter containing the 1-5 Mech Command Group (CO, S3, Arty LNO, SGM, and RTO) took off from FSB Devin enroute to the target area.

    b.  At 1745 hours, the 1st Platoon, 3rd Platoon and Command Group of Company B, 2nd Battalion, 14th Infantry, took off in a nine ship lift from FSB Patton enroute to the target area.

    c.  At 1746 hours, the Arty LNO began a nine minute countdown to the time on target for the initial preparatory fires.  Two batteries of 105mm howitzers, one battery of 155mm howitzers, and two 8 inch howitzers were laid on the target hut.

    d.  At 1754 hours, two Cobra gunships made a firing run from west to east against the target hut and the hut to the north.  Their rockets blew the roofs off of both structures, and as they cleared the target area, the Arty LNO gave the waiting batteries the command to fire.

    e.  At 1755 hours, the target hut and an area for 80 meters around it was hit by 34 rounds of artillery.  The battery fires were then shifted into the brush north, northeast, and east of the hut (See Enclosure 3).  Immediately after the artillery fires were shifted, the escorting gunships moved in and placed suppressive fires on the huts and on the area around the landing zone.
  
 

Enclosure 3 - Initial Artillery Fire

  
    f.  The troop ships approached the landing zone from the north and touched down 30 seconds after the last preparatory artillery round impacted.  At this time, numerous enemy were observed fleeing to the east and south through the brush.  The gunships began firing passes over the area to the east and the Arty LNO shifted all batteries and resumed fire to the south to block that area.  (See Enclosure 4)
  
 

Enclosure 4 - Landing Zone and supporting gunship and artillery fires

  
    g.  As the troops hit the ground, the Company Commander realized that instead of landing in a trail formation as planned, they had landed in a split trail and his 1st Platoon was advancing behind the 3rd Platoon.  He quickly ordered this platoon to move on line to the left, as the company continued the assault.  They received only sporadic and ineffective fire from the withdrawing enemy and they rapidly overran the objective, killing several fleeing enemy.  As they secured their positions around the huts, they began to check the rubble and numerous holes and bunkers in the area, collecting prisoners (10 detainees), recovering abandoned equipment, and counting the enemy dead (47 KIA).  When the immediate target area had been [end of page]


    [Start of next page missing...] the gunships again provided suppressive fires.  The troop ships received light fire from the east as they lifted off.  (See Enclosure 5)
  
 

Enclosure 5 - Assault, Search and Return

  
    h. As the troop ships cleared the area, two F-100 fighters hit the area with fragmentation bombs and napalm.  This strike was followed by another at 1935 hours by two A-37 fighters.  At 2000 hours, the Division G5 Section diverted a UH1H PSYOPS helicopter to the contact area and broadcast "Surrender or Die" appeals for 30 minutes.  At 2100 hours, an artillery attack of 145 rounds was made on the contact area, and this was followed by another PSYOPS mission at 2300 hours consisting of surrender appeals and 30,000 safe conduct passes and "Chieu Hoi" leaflets being dropped.

    i. On the following day, 20 June, the 1-5 Mech conducted a reconnaissance-in-force through the contact area with one mechanized and two rifle companies.  No contact was made with the enemy, but several additional enemy bodies and weapons were found, and large amounts of rice and medical supplies were evacuated.  Another PSYOPS leaflet mission was flown specifically targeted against the 83rd Rear Service Group.

13.  RESULTS:

    a.  Friendly Casualties and Losses:  None.

    b.  Enemy Casualties:

        (1) KIA - 54.

        (2) Captured - 10.

    c.  Enemy Equipment and Supply Losses:

        (1) 28 AK-47 Rifles.

        (2) 10 RPG-2 Rocket Launchers.

        (3) 1 RPD Light Machine Gun.

        (4) 2 K54 Pistols.

        (5) 2 RPG rounds.

        (6) 1 M1 Carbine.

        (7) 1 Chicom Radio.  [end of page]

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        (10) 6 lbs documents.

    d.  Results of Detainee Interrogation.

Le Van Coung    Alias Sau Cuong    Status:  VC PW

    Position:  Pvt/Laborer.
    Unit:  C-130, 83rd Rear Service Group (C-130 transports supplies).
    Weapons:  2 Hand Grenades.
    Information Gained:  C-130 has about 30 men; the unit is subordinate to the 83rd Rear Service Group.  Subject stated his mission was to transport rice by boat on the Saigon River where it would be picked up by civilian laborers at various spots.
    No other significant information.

Nguyen Van Thanh    Alias Hai    Status:  NVA PW

    Position:  Squad Leader-Rifleman.
    Unit:  3rd Squad, 2nd Platoon, 1st Company, 2nd Battalion, 250 Regt, AKA Bac Son Regt.
    Weapons:  1 AK-47 Rifle.
    Information Gained:  Subject was to recon terrain in vicinity XT5727 for unknown reason.  His unit now located in woods north of Tay Ninh.
    No other significant information.

Dang Thi Mung (F)    Alias Hai Mung    Status:  VCG PW (WIA)

    Position:  Nurse.
    Unit:  A-17 Dispensary.
    Weapons:  None.
    Information Gained:  Subject was a nurse; worked in the A-17 dispensary located XT589268 in a bunker.  A-17 is in support of Xom Trai Local Forces who are in support of Cu Chi District Forces.
    No other significant information gained.

Le Thi Sung (F)    Status:  CD

    Information Gained:  Denies knowledge, participation or support of VC activities.  Subject works in her mother's rice fields XT589266 and as a hat maker.  Classified CD because she lacked the proper ID card; had only a temporary ID issued in 1966. [end of page]


    [Start of next page missing...]
Tran Thi Trung (F)    Status:  VCS CD

    Information:  None.
    Classified CD because she had no ID card; subject claimed she did not think she had to have an ID card until she was 18 years old.  She is 16 years old.

    Three other detainees were classified as innocent civilians and released.

    e.  Intelligence Summary:

    The installation destroyed in this raid had housed the A-17 Local Force Dispensary, served as a supply point for the 83rd Rear Service Group and as a way station for VC/NVA elements moving through the area.

14.  ANALYSIS:

    a.  The acquisition of this target resulted from the alertness of the imagery interpreters, the patient surveillance of a suspected target, and the efficient teamwork of the various sections of the military intelligence detachment.  A suspicious structure had been developed into a confirmed, lucrative target.

    b.  The success of the operation was due to detailed planning and violent execution.  The precise timing and heavy volume of preparatory fires produced a shock effect from which the enemy was given no opportunity to recover; the assault troops were inserted close to the objective under covering fire from the gunships while the artillery pursued the disorganized enemy and blocked their escape.  The objective was seized rapidly, while the continuous supporting fires prevented any enemy re-organization.  The ground search was conducted thoroughly and swiftly and the troops were extracted before the enemy could develop any counter action.

    c.  It is interesting to note the statements of an enemy senior captain of Sub-Region 1, captured by the 2-14 Inf on 10 July, concerning the efficiency of U.S. operations against the VC/NVA.  Under interrogation, the prisoner stated that, from his long experience, the most effective [end of page]


    [Start of next page missing...] daylight hours by locating specific targets through intelligence.

                        MICHAEL D. KEATING
                        Major, Armor
                        Commanding

19-Jul-69 After Action Report - Bravo Company Raid
Copyright © 2009 Kirk S. Ramsey
Last modified: November 18, 2009